In this empirical study, the incidence of the shares transfers by the original shareholders on the degree of the initial underpricing is studied, using a sample of Tunisian candidates companies over the 1992-2006 period. Our empirical results make it possible to confirm the existence of a significant initial underpricing of about 19% and which depends closely on the behavior of shares transfer. More precisely, the original and the controlling shareholders, in order to limit the transfer of wealth towards the new shareholders, reduce the degree of IPO underpricing.
Introduction
Underpricing has been the subject of numerous empirical studies. It has been observed in several countries all over the world and is a mysterious phenomenon which is linked to the majority of newly listed companies. It appears as a positive divergence between the quoted and offer prices. Among these studies, we refer to those of Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) and Broye and Schatt (2001) who show that the underwriters issue the shares to the public at a price lower than the "fair" price. This resulted in an abnormally high return in the initial trading days.
The work of Loughran & al. (1994) summarizes the results of a number of important studies on the underpricing of Initial Public Offerings (hereafter IPOs) in 25 countries. In most of these countries there is persistently positive initial-day return (or underpricing) for all initial issues. The highest average initial stock returns (388%) were recorded in the Chinese IPO market and the lowest (4.20%) in the French IPO market. According to Clendenning and Associates (2001) , the shares issued on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) are underpriced on average by 5.80% (14% according to Jog and Hitsman, 2000) compared with 10.90% on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and 49.60% on the NASDAQ. Loo and Riding (2001) also noted that the IPO underpricing on the NASDAQ is greater for the technological companies than traditional ones.
The initial underpricing phenomenon has various theoretical explanations in the financial IPO literature. For some writers, the anomaly stems from a problem of asymmetric information between the investment bank and the issuing firms (Baron, 1982) or between a group of informed investors and another, uninformed (Rock, 1986) . According to Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) and Ritter (1991) , the IPO underpricing stems from excess optimism on the investor's part, who pay a higher price than the "fair" price defined by the underwriter. Another explanation supposes that the underwriter must offer a price voluntarily lower than the "fair" market price in order to remunerate the risk taken by the investors, who are unable to estimate future cash flows distribution correctly, because of the uncertainty and asymmetric information concerning this operation. The underpricing also makes it possible to attract a certain category of better informed investors, in general institutional, who demand compensation for their part in the IPO process (Rock, 1986; Beatty and Ritter, 1986) . Welch (1992) shows by his "cascade» theory that IPO underpricing is used by the underwriters to start a massive movement of purchasing at the IPO time. Allen and Faulhaber (1989) , Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Ruud (1993) justify the underpricing by the presence of a price support by the underwriters during the first days of stock trading. More recently Connelly & al. (2004) explain the initial underpricing phenomenon by a proxy related to asymmetric information as the ex-ante uncertainty. Venkatesh and Neupane (2004) attribute this to the regulatory environment, and to some characteristics specific to each market and to the periods of introduction (cold vs. hot) 1 . If several hypotheses have been put forward to explain initial underpricing, few studies have been concerned with the possible relationship between the evolution of the shareholding structure and the undervaluation of the new listings. However, the IPO has some important effects on the firm governance system. In addition, this process generates a loss of control for the current shareholders, since it consists of selling a large block of shares. Moreover, the new shareholders intervene in the company management with a view to maximizing its market value, while the original shareholders seek to maximize their personal remuneration and assets. The result is a transfer of wealth from current shareholders in favor of new investors. Accordingly, one might think that the evolution of the IPO current ownership structure determines the listed company behavior on the market (Roosenboom and van der Goot, 2005) since the degree of the underpricing depends on the extent of the costs sustained by the IPOs firms.
The present study considers the impact of shares transfer by both the original and the controlling shareholders on the degree of underpricing at the IPO time in the Tunisian Stock Exchange (TSE). The comprehension of the impact of the behavior of stock transfer on the initial IPO underpricing is of great interest given the policy adopted by the Tunisian Financial Market Council (FMC) to promote the stock market by the creation of an alternative market. The results should represent an important first step in understanding the IPO market in Tunisia and yield additional insights regarding determinants of IPO underpricing in emerging capital markets.
For this reason (as Broye and Shatt, 2003) , the corporate governance is described using the transfer of old shares by the original shareholders. This kind of transfer is found more frequently used than the new issues transfer 2 . The remainder of the article is divided into six sections. The next section highlights some empirical studies focusing on the relationship between the transfer of shares and the degree of IPO underpricing. In section 3 and 4 data, study sample, methodology and variables used in our empirical analysis are described. Section 5 reports regression results and offer robustness analyses. The concluding section summarizes the major findings.
The Repercussion Of The Transfer Of Shares By The Controlling Shareholders On The Ipo Underpricing
Recently, the study of samples of newly listed companies in the stock market, notably those of Hill (2006) Leland and Pyle (1977) who show that a significant share transfer signals a limited profit prospect of the firm and consequently incites shareholders to proceed with the devaluation of shares to attract potential investors.
Whatever the significance of this relationship, adequate theoretical explanations in the financial IPO literature are found. In fact, the signaling theory stipulates that the larger the share part sold, the larger the IPO underpricing 4 . The entrenchment theory bears out that the shareholders are incited to reduce the initial underpricing when they sell a large number of shares 5 .
Data And Study Sample
Before presenting our study results, the work sample is described.
Data Sources
All companies newly listed on the Tunisian Stock Exchange (TSE) between March 1992 and March 2006 are identified. For all these firms, the characteristics of the issuers (sector, age, size, debt level, year founded) and the issuance (introduction date, issue date, offer price, number of shares available to the public, capital taken up, auditor and financial intermediary's identity) are taken from the candidate's IPO prospectuses out from the Tunisian FMC. The data on the closing prices and the market index are taken from the daily price index of the TSE. Information on the shareholding structure before and after going public is collected from IPO prospectus.
Study Sample
Our original sample comprises 47 Tunisian IPOs firms, candidates for listing on the stock market. However, we were able to consult the IPO prospectus for only 40 of them. Among these 40 IPO companies, regulation means that big shareholders have an unhindered ability to pursue private benefits at the expense of other minor shareholders. Chen and Strange (2004) , have proved in the case of poor regulatory environment that high concentration ratio leads to lower initial IPO return as the market correctly identifies the ability of the dominant stockholder to pursue private benefits easily and without penalty. 4 The managers, who are supposed to be better informed than the other investors, offer them a premium to encourage their participation in the IPO process. 5 The aim is to protect the profits linked to the control of the original shareholders and limit the wealth losses incurred after listing on the Stock Market Exchange. 32 were retained, those which produced a detailed account of their shareholding structure. For each year the total number of IPO firms in the Tunisian Stock Exchange, the number of available prospectuses, the number of the candidate companies in the study sample and the size of the offering are indicated.
Methodology Of Research
The methodology used to study the incidence of transferring shares on the IPO underpricing, consists of regressing the degree of the underpricing on variables describing the fraction of shares transferred.
Variables. Measures
In the financial literature relating to the study of the initial underpricing of newly listed companies, several measurements of the IPO underpricing are recorded. In fact, the most widely used approach to examine the level of initial stock returns of the newly listed shares is the method of Unadjusted Initial Underpricing (IU). More precisely, the IU is calculated using the following equation:
Where P i0 : the initial offer price for the i th candidate company. P i1 : the average closing prices for the i th candidate company on the first five trading days 6 . Concerning the explanatory variables describing the shares transfer by the original shareholders, the following variables are defined according Broye and Schatt (2003) :  LnORIOWNER : Is the napierian logarithm of one, plus the proportion of the old shares offered by the original group of shareholders at the IPO time (the number of old shares transferred divided by the total number of shares existing before IPO).  LnCONOWNER : Is the napierian logarithm of one, plus the fraction of old shares offered by the original controlling shareholders (the number of old transferred shares divided by the total number of shares existing before IPO). The blockholders who own 5% or more of the stocks are retained as control shareholders. 6 We decided to calculate the initial underpricing on the first five days as the newly listed stock may not be quoted on the stock exchange at first. This is because of the high demand from investors result in a rising reservation of the said stock. For example, during listing, Tunisair shares were sought by 150.000 subscribers for an offer which was subscribed 3,8 times. Others such as Morck & al. (1988) point out that the extent of underpricing also depends on the share part which is still held by the controlling shareholders. In fact, the larger the proportion after going public, the larger the extent of IPO underpricing, as the controlling shareholders are able to compensate for the costs resulting from the initial underpricing, by the advantages they gain within the company as controlling shareholders. This fraction is represented by the variable LnTOPOWNER, calculated as the napierian logarithm of one, plus the proportion of the shares held by the first and second controlling shareholders after the IPO.
In addition, the various studies found in the financial IPO literature, concord with the fact that the initial IPO underpricing increases with ex-ante uncertainty. At this point it is interesting to introduce other control variables describing this uncertainty. These variables are defined below:  SIZE : Is the offering size measured as the number of shares issued on the market, multiplied by the final offer price. The results communally accepted in the financial IPO literature stipulate that shares initial returns are negatively linked to the offering size (Henry & al., 2003; Faugeron-Crouzet and Ginglinger, 2002) .
The age of the candidate company measured by the difference between the number of years of listing on the stock exchange and the creation of the company 7 . The ex-ante risk of the candidate company supposedly grows with age. The more recent the activity of a company, the more difficult it is to predict its future development, and thus it should show a larger initial underpricing (Bilson & The financial leverage which corresponds to the relationship between the book value of debts 8 and the book value of total assets. It has been established that a high leverage ratio before going public, raises the ex-ante uncertainty (Venkatesh and Neupane, 2004) .  REP-A: A dummy variable measuring the reputation of the auditor. It is equal to 1 (one), if the auditor is one of the "big four" 9 , and 0 (zero) otherwise. The reputation of the auditor effectively reflects the value of the candidate company and is linked to a lowest IPO underpricing (Clarkson & al., 1992) .  REP-IF: Dummy indicator of the financial intermediary reputation. It is equal to 1 (one) if the IPO operation is driven by a well renowned underwriter and 0 (zero) otherwise. The rating of the underwriter is based on the size of the issues they have managed as a listing agent. Thus, if the underwriter introduces a company of which the issuance size is superior (respectively inferior) to the average, the underwriter is supposed to be renowned (unrenowned). Clarkson and Merkley (1994) and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) show that the initial IPO underpricing is lower when the candidate company uses a prestigious financial intermediary.
Methodology
The basic objective of this study is to identify the repercussion of shares transfer on the degree of the initial IPO underpricing. For this purpose, the proportion of existing shares proposed by both the original and the controlling shareholders at the IPO date is taken into account. We have built the following regression models to test some of the proxies of information asymmetry model along with the shares transfer variable. The regression models thus retained are as follow:
.1) and
To estimate these two models, an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is applied. Besides, as the distribution of the initial underpricing variable deviates from a normal one 10 and given the narrowness of our study sample, the "bootstrap" method is applied to obtain efficient estimators.
Discussion Of The Empirical Results
The descriptive results concerning the different variables presented above are set out successively with those of the regression models.
Descriptive Analysis
The descriptive analysis provided in Table ( 2) (Panel A) shows that Tunisian candidate companies wait, on average, 20 years before being listed on the stock exchange, which is remarkably low if compared to Italy and Japan IPOs but similar to other European samples. It reveals also that these newly listed companies, even if they are small, are linked to the phenomena of underpricing, as in most stock markets. The initial stock return made by an investor who is able to sell the stock acquired at the initial offering price after the first five trading days, is on average 19.22%. This underpricing is significantly different from zero at the level of 1%. Our results confirm those obtained in the majority of studies. Concerning the Tunisian studies, the initial underpricing previously detected is smaller than that found in the study of Ben Naceur and Omri (1997) which showed an average underpricing of 29.58% over a study period between 1991 and 1995. It is also, smaller than the one noted by Ben Naceur and Ghanem (2001), being 27.82% over the 1990-1999 period. It must be pointed out that these authors used a different measure from the one used in this study. The initial IPO underpricing recorded in the developed capital markets shows a smaller devaluation: 10% on the American market, 6.44% on the Canadian market and 13.23% on the French market 11 . The degree of initial underpricing recorded in this article is distinctly smaller than that found on the stock market of other emerging countries. For example, the Chinese capital stock exchange shows an IPO underpricing of 388%, that of Malaysia 80.30% and South Korea 78.10% Table ( 2) reveals that half the companies in the study sample called on the services of a reputable underwriter. Moreover, 53.13% of the companies are checked by high repute auditors at the IPO time.
Concerning the behavior of the old shares transfer, it can be noted that the controlling shareholders are those who sell a large part of their shares, on average 21.36% of the stock, for a total of 25.63% of shares sold. In spite of this, a large proportion of the shareholding in Tunisian candidate companies persists after going public, given that the controlling shareholders still hold about 2/3 of the shares post-IPO: the first two controlling shareholders possess more than 40% 13 , not noticeably different from other markets 14 . This highlights clearly that controlling shareholders retain the majority of the capital after the IPO.
It appears that the IPO market in Tunisia is largely undervalued. This IPO underpricing represents, as Kooli states (2000), an indirect cost linked to the IPO process which the issuing company must bear. Thus, the underpricing can influence the choice of financing of Tunisian companies and dissuade them from seeking the capital necessary to their economic growth by issuing stocks.
We shall try to check the behavior of share transfer of existing shareholders influence 11 See Kooli (2000) . 12 For a summary of past results see Loughran et al. (1994) and Ritter (1998) . 13 The detailed results concerning the development of the original shareholders structure and the two controlled shareholders before and after listing on the stock exchange, are available on demand. 14 
Analysis Of The Influence Of Shares Transfer On The Degree Of Initial Underpricing
The results obtained from the regression models (2.1) and (2.2) confirm the influence of the different explanatory variables on the degree of IPO underpricing. The results are given in Table ( 3). Because of the multicolinarity problems, different reduced models are examined. It is noticed that the shares transferred by the original shareholders (Ln ORIOWNER) exert a negative influence on the initial underpricing. As far as the transfer of shares by the controlling shareholders is concerned (Ln CONOWNER), it seems that they also influence the IPO underpricing in a negative fashion. These results were endorsed and became even more significant when controlling for the fraction of shares still held by the controlling shareholders after going public. This leads us to think that the controlling shareholders do not necessarily profit from the greater private advantages resulting from the listing of their company on the stock exchange. This could be due to the fact that the Tunisian candidate companies introduce only a small part of their capital and consequently the variation in the fraction of shares held by controlling shareholders after the operation is insignificant.
In short, the negative signs of the coefficients associated with the variables describing the behavior of share transfer supports further the entrenchment theory according to which the original and controlling shareholders are urged to limit the initial IPO underpricing, in order to reduce their potential wealth losses following the transfer of a part of their companies shares to the public. These assumptions confirm the results put forward by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and La Porta & al. (2000) .
Concerning the relationship between the underpricing and control variables, it confirms the results of most of the empirical studies, with the exception of the auditor-reputation variable (REP-A) which has a positive impact on the IPO underpricing, without, however, being statistically significant. It is also the case for the leverage variable (LEV), which is negatively and statistically correlated to the degree of the IPO underpricing (at the level of 5%). To conclude, it is interesting to specify that the quality of the models used is relatively good with an R 2 of over 40%. This result tends to show that share transfers explain an important part of the IPO underpricing of new listings. 
. The total study sample is composed of 32 IPO firm listed in the TSE over the period March 1992-March 2006. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses; ** and * denote statistical significance at 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Adjusted R 2 values are indicated.
Tests of robustness
In order to test the robustness of our results, another measure of the initial IPO underpricing was used. The adjusted underpricing allows us to take into consideration the market fluctuations 15 R m : return of the market index benchmark for the first five trading days after fixing the initial price.
Ii 0 : the opening stock market index for the i th candidate company on the offering day. I i1 : the average closing stock market index for the i th candidate company on the first five trading days. Regression models similar to those used in the equations (2.1) and (2.2) are then used by replacing the IU measure by MAIU as the explanatory variable.
The results presented in Table ( 5) have substantially changed. In fact, when the fraction of the shares transferred by the original shareholders at the public offering date has a significant negative effect on the underpricing, the controlling shareholders do not appear as a significant variable.
These results could be due to the fact that, in reality the relationship between variables describing the shareholding and the underpricing is not linear. In fact, certain studies have concluded a curvilinear relationship between the transfer of shares and the underpricing (Short and Keasy, 1999; Morck & al., 1988) . In order to do this, we took from Kim & al. (2004) by introducing the models quadratic form and the cubic form of the proportion of shares transferred by the original shareholders as well as by the controlling shareholders, that is the following variables (LnORIOWNER) 2 , (LnORIOWNER) 3 and (LnCONOWNER) 2 , (LnCONOWNER) 3 to confirm the nonlinear hypothesis. The coefficients linked to the variables (LnORIOWNER) -(LnCONOWNER) and (LnORIOWNER) 3 -(LnCONOWNER) 3 should be positive and those of the variables (LnORIOWNER) 2 -(LnCONOWNER) 2 should be negative. The results presented in Table ( 5) show that the nonlinear relationship between the transfer of shares and the IPO underpricing (measured respectively by the IU and MAIU variables) is not significant. Thus, it appears that the conclusion preestablished concerning the impact of the behavior of share transfer by the original and control shareholders over the degree of IPO underpricing is well and truly measured by a linear relationship. On the other hand, our results seem to be affected by the choice of the underpricing measure. 
Conclusion
This study revealed interesting facts, but there still remain certain limits which would give themselves to further studies.
Summary of results
The underpricing of IPOs is a mysterious phenomenon in both theoretical and practical circles. Initial IPO underpricing of share transfer on the TSE is analyzed in this article. It transpires that, as in most stock markets, the market price of the shares of Tunisian listed companies significantly exceeds the offer price. More precisely, the Tunisian stock market, over the period 1992-2006, displayed an average IPO underpricing of about 19% and is very unstable. This is larger than that recorded in the developed countries. It is however lower than that recorded in the emerging stock markets such as China, Malaysia and South Korea. This relatively discount constitutes an implied cost supported by the original shareholders and leads to the fact that the Tunisian financial market suffers from evaluation problem. The study of the possible relationship between the return of initial issues and the transfer of shares, enlightens us concerning the behavior adopted by both the original and the controlling shareholders. During a new listing, these shareholders are incited to reduce the underpricing in order to preserve their wealth. Thus, the entrenchment theory seems better adapted to the analysis of the phenomena of initial underpricing of Tunisian candidate companies. The result, however, seems sensitive to the choice of the measure of the underpricing.
Our results also reveal, as for most studies recorded in the financial IPO literature, that the majority of the variables describing the ex-ante uncertainty before issuance (size and age of the new listing, the underwriter reputation), makes the underpricing degree rise.
Study contributions
This study seems particularly interesting in Tunisia, where the economic tissue is made up of a family firms majority, heavily indebted and where almost all the introductions to the stock exchange are made by shares transfer by the original shareholders.
More precisely, this article presents an empirical contribution, as we believe it to be the first study concerned with urging original shareholders to underprice Tunisian candidate companies for listing in the stock market.
Works which have leaned in this direction of the study on IPO on the TSE (Tunisian Stock Exchange) were limited to descriptive statistics. This study is an attempt to define explanatory factors for the underpricing enigma on the Tunisian market. At the same time, this study allows us to compare our results with other studies carried out in both developed and emerging markets.
The robustness tests of were the most methodical part on the work.
This article is also of a practical interest in as far as the study of the performance of the candidate companies contributes to the analysis of the IPO process to decide if it is worth investing in initial public offering.
Limit and future fields of research
The narrowness of our study sample, although justified, imposes a restraining limit. Taking a larger sample, we could have improved our analysis and studied the distribution of initial issues according to the state of the stock market before issuance. In conclusion, the study of the underpricing anomaly must be complemented by a study of long term performance. It might be profitable to invest in a newly listed company in the short term, whereas the long term stock exchange performance could well be disappointing.
